Roger Stone, a long-time political strategist and commentator, has recently offered commentary on the administrative decisions that allowed the 9/11 hijackers to obtain visas and enter the United States. His remarks, made in anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, focus on Saudi visa practices and the past role of former CIA official John Brennan in the kingdom. Stone's commentary, published in a StoneZone article, argues that weak screening protocols created an exploitable opening for al-Qaeda operatives.
"How CIA Director John Brennan let the 9/11 hijackers into America" Roger Stone, Social Media Post
The September 11, 2001, attacks, which claimed nearly 3,000 lives, involved 19 al-Qaeda hijackers who seized four commercial passenger planes. Two planes struck the World Trade Center in New York City, one hit the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and another crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The subsequent investigation by the 9/11 Commission detailed significant failures across various U.S. government systems that contributed to the attackers' ability to enter and operate within the country.
According to the 9/11 Commission's staff report on terrorist travel, fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi nationals. Of these, fourteen obtained their visas through U.S. diplomatic posts located in Saudi Arabia, with one receiving a visa from elsewhere. The report further highlighted a critical detail: eleven of these hijackers received their visas from a single consular officer stationed in Jeddah. The commission's findings indicated that several applications submitted by the hijackers were incomplete, and many applicants were not subjected to an interview, a standard practice for visa issuance. The report documented specific problems with the applications, including questionable addresses, misspelled locations, and information that should have triggered additional scrutiny from consular officials.
A particular point of focus in Stone's commentary, and examined by the 9/11 Commission, is the "Visa Express" program. Introduced across Saudi Arabia in June 2001, just months before the attacks, this program allowed applicants to submit their paperwork through designated travel agencies. Interviews with consular officials were conducted only when specifically requested by the officials themselves, a departure from more direct engagement. Four of the hijackers received their visas in Jeddah during the period when Visa Express was operational. While the commission stated that Visa Express was created primarily to reduce crowds and enhance security at diplomatic facilities, it did not conclude that the program increased visa approval rates for Saudi applicants. However, the commission did find that the system significantly reduced direct contact between applicants and consular officers and led to the termination of a more aggressive interview policy that had been in place in Jeddah.
Stone's commentary directly links these visa system issues to John Brennan, who served as the CIA station chief in Riyadh from 1996 to 1999. Official biographies confirm Brennan's tenure in this role before his later appointment as CIA Director. Stone also reiterates claims made by former consular officer J. Michael Springmann. Springmann, who was assigned to Jeddah from 1987 to 1989, alleged that CIA personnel exerted influence over visa decisions at the consulate during his posting. It is important to note that Springmann's account predates the hijackers' visa applications by more than a decade.
The 9/11 Commission, in its comprehensive investigation, did not establish that the CIA utilized the consulate to facilitate the entry of future hijackers into the United States. Furthermore, the commission did not conclude that Saudi officials, acting as a government, directed the September 11 attacks. The commission's ultimate conclusion was that the hijackers successfully entered the U.S. due to a confluence of institutional failures, specifically citing deficiencies in visa processing, immigration inspections, intelligence sharing among agencies, and overall information management. The report also documented that the hijackers passed through U.S. ports of entry a total of 33 times and were refused entry on only one occasion. Several of the individuals used fraudulent documents or violated existing immigration rules.
The visa records and the broader questions surrounding potential Saudi connections to the 9/11 plot remain a subject of public interest and debate. Former CIA Director Brennan has previously stated that there is no evidence indicating that the Saudi government, as an institution, directed the attacks. The 9/11 Commission's report also acknowledged that intelligence agencies had received repeated warnings regarding Osama bin Laden's plans but lacked the specific details necessary to identify and thwart the full operation. Stone's article advocates for commemorations of the 9/11 attacks to extend beyond remembering the victims and also to critically examine the administrative and systemic decisions that allowed the attackers to obtain visas and navigate screening systems prior to September 11, 2001. His commentary underscores ongoing concerns about institutional failures, public accountability, and transparency in government operations.
